Th is paper touches controversial issues, and some of the possibilities discussed will undoubtedly make some readers uncomfortable. Th is is because it takes seriously in a particular way both the historic Christian message and a modern scientifi c perspective, emphasizing their cognitive claims as I understand them from a Quaker perspective. Th e reader may not share this double commitment. Neverthe less the argument is logically and epistemologically sound; the unease is at a theological and/or metaphysical level. Th is issue will be discussed briefl y in the last main section. However, a full treatment cannot be given here; an indepth justifi cation for the view taken has been given in other works.
1
For the moment I make the initial claims that: (1) there are other types of knowledge besides that given by the "hard" sciences, for example, that given by philosophy, theology, humanistic, and artistic disciplines-the task is to fi nd a viewpoint that does justice to these issues as well as to hard science, in a compatible way; (2) the hypothetico-deductive method used to support the viewpoint presented here is essentially the same as that underlying our acceptance of modern science; and (3) the main themes proposed, controversial as they are, are supported by as much or indeed more evidence (admittedly of a more general form than that used by physics alone) than many of the themes of modern theoretical physics.
Th e requirement in order to approach the material fairly is an open mind in looking at the various logically possible options, rather than george f.r. ellis simply selecting one particular metaphysical stance on an a priori basis. Th e important point is that we have to adopt some metaphysical position; we should do so here in a considered way.
Introduction
Th is paper is largely a response to Nancey Murphy's contribution to this volume, "Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan's Ass and Schrödinger's Cat." Th at paper is revolutionary because it represents a conservative interpretation of the Christian faith 2 which, unlike most other such interpretations, takes the content of modern science seriously as part of the task of constructive theology. Th e viewpoint here will be to basically agree with Murphy's paper, and comment on some specifi c issues raised by its thesis.
Accepting the main thesis of that paper, the themes I would like to discuss further are: (a) the issue of capricious action; (b) the issue of top-down causation through intention, and the particular causal nexus of the action; and (c) the issue of evidence for the position stated.
As regards (a), one of the main problems for the proposal is the charge of capriciousness in God's action, in terms of God deciding now and then to act contrary to the regular patterns of events but oft en deciding not to do so. One would like to have articulated some kind of criterion of choice underlying such decisions, and then an analysis given of how that criterion might work out in practice. Th is has to take very seriously indeed the issue of evil, pain, and suff ering as experienced in the present-day world, of God's acceptance and allowance of horrors of all kinds, which one might a priori presume he/she could and would prevent if he/she so desired. If the usual Christian view is to make sense, there has to be a cast-iron reason why a merciful and loving God does not alleviate a lot more of the suff ering in the world, if he/she has indeed the power to do so. Th is leads to the question of when divine action may be expected to take place, in either an "ordi-
